Rival Lovers

On what were the two youths so earnestly engaged? and I said, Surely it is a subject important and beautiful, on which they have bestowed so serious an attention.—

ATHLETIC RIVAL: What call you important and beautiful? said he. They are prating about things above in the sky, and trifling away their time in philosophizing.—

Do you think it, young man, to be a disgraceful thing to philosophize? or why do you speak so harshly?—

LEARNED RIVAL: It is not for you, Socrates, to ask this man, whether he thinks it disgraceful to philosophize. Know you not that he has spent all his time in being throstled, and cramming himself, and sleeping? so that what other answer think you he would give, but that it is disgraceful to philosophize?—

I said therefore to him, that I had proposed my question in common for all; but if you think you will give a better answer, I put the same question to you as I did to him, Whether you think it honourable to philosophize or not?—

LEARNED RIVAL: Should I ever, Socrates, said he, consider it disgraceful to philosophize, I should no longer deem myself a human being; nor, indeed, any one else, so disposed,

To you, then, said I, it seems honourable to philosophize.—

LEARNED RIVAL: Most highly, replied he.

SOCRATES: [2.] What then, said I; does it seem to you possible for a man to know any thing whatever, whether it is disgraceful or honourable, who does not know at all what that thing is?—

LEARNED RIVAL: No, said he.—

SOCRATES: Know you then, said I, what it is to philosophize?—

LEARNED RIVAL: Perfectly, said he.—

SOCRATES: What is it then? said I.—

LEARNED RIVAL: What else, (said he,) than according to the sentiment of Solon? For Solon says some where,

And it appears to me that the man, who would philosophize, ought to be always learning some one thing at least, when he is either young or old, in order that he may during life learn the greatest number of things.—

LEARNED RIVAL: Completely so, said he.—

SOCRATES: And do you consider, said I, that philosophy is only honourable? or good likewise?—

LEARNED RIVAL: It is likewise very good, said he.—

SOCRATES: Do you perceive it to be something peculiar to philosophy? or does it seem to you to be the case in other things likewise? For instance, do you consider a love of gymnastic exercises to be not only honourable but good likewise, or not?—

LEARNED RIVAL: To this man let it be said, that it is neither; but to you, Socrates, I acknowledge it to be both honourable and good.—

SOCRATES: (I then asked him), Do you think that in these exercises the undergoing much toil is a love of exercise?—

LEARNED RIVAL: By all means, said he; just as in philosophizing, I consider that much learning is philosophy.—

SOCRATES: Do you think then, said I, that the lovers of these exercises desire any thing else than that, which will cause the body to be in a good state?—

LEARNED RIVAL: That very thing, he replied.—

SOCRATES: Do then, said I, many labours, cause the body to be in a good state?—

LEARNED RIVAL: Certainly, said he; for how should a person have, from little labour, his body in a good state?—

Why are you silent, O best of men, while this person is talking thus? Or to you likewise do persons seem to have their bodies in a good state from much labour or little?—

ATHLETIC RIVAL: For my part, Socrates, said he, I thought he had known the saying, that moderate labour is best for the body.—

SOCRATES: How so? (said I).—

ATHLETIC RIVAL: (I speak) not of a man sleepless, and foodless, and having his neck not worn down and attenuated by care.

I then said, What then, do you now concede that neither much nor little labour causes human beings to have their bodies in a good state, but only what is moderate? or will you contest with us two?—

LEARNED RIVAL: Against him, said he, I would enter the lists with much pleasure, and I know well that I should be competent to support the proposition I have laid down, if I had laid down one weaker than this; for he is nothing. But against you I beg not to contend in favour of a paradox; and I admit, that not many, but moderate exercises procure for men a good habit of body.—

SOCRATES: And what in the case of food? said I. Is it the moderate, or much?—

What then, said I, as regards the soul? Of the things applied to it do the moderate or the immoderate benefit it?—

LEARNED RIVAL: The moderate, said he.—

SOCRATES: Is not learning one of the things applied to the soul?—

Of learning then, the moderate quantity benefits, but not the great.—

What kinds of learning do we best conjecture those are, which a philosopher ought to learn? since they are not all or many.

Do you mean in the same way, said I, as in carpentry? For there you may purchase a tip-top carpenter for five or six minæ; but you could not (buy) an architect even for ten thousand drachmas; so few of these are to be found amongst all the Greeks. Are you speaking of some such thing?—

LEARNED RIVAL: Do not understand me, Socrates, said he, as if I were saying that a philosopher ought to know each of the arts accurately, as he does, who makes it his profession; but to be able, as becomes a person of a liberal education, to follow better than the persons present, what is said by the handicraftsman; and to give his opinion so as to appear, in what is said and done relating to the arts, to have a finer taste, and more knowledge, than those who happen to be present.—

SOCRATES: Then I—for I was still doubtful what he meant by his speech—said to him, Do I conceive rightly what kind of person you call a philosopher? For you seem to me to speak of a person, such as are the competitors in five kinds of contest, compared with the runner, or the wrestlers. For the former fall short of the latter, as regards the contests of the latter, and are second to them; but of all the other competitors, they are the first, and are the victors. Some such thing you mean perhaps that the study of philosophy effects in those, who pursue it, in that they fall short of the first prize, in the intellect relating to the arts, but in attaining the second, they are superior to all the rest; so that he, who has studied philosophy, becomes in every thing a person under the tip-top man. Some such person you seem to me to point out.—

LEARNED RIVAL: You appear to me, Socrates, said he, to understand correctly what relates to a philosopher, in likening him to a competitor in five contests. For he is really such a man, as not to be a slave to any thing; nor has he laboured upon any one thing with such accuracy, as, through his attention to that one thing, to be deficient in all the rest, as are handicraftsmen, but he has touched moderately upon all.

LEARNED RIVAL: Useful, surely, Socrates, said he.—

SOCRATES: If then the good are useful, are not the bad useless?—

Well then, said I, do you deem philosophers to be useful, or not?—

Come now, (said I,) let us see whether you say what is true. How can these second-rate men be of any use to us? For it is plain that the philosopher is inferior to each of those who possess their respective arts.—

Come then, said I, if either yourself were unwell, or any of your friends, for whom you have a great regard, would you, being desirous to recover health, introduce the second-rate person, the philosopher, to your family; or take a physician.—

LEARNED RIVAL: Both of them, said he.—

SOCRATES: Do not say both, I replied; but which in preference, and the first?—

LEARNED RIVAL: No man, said he, would hesitate about this, that (I would take) the physician in preference and first.—

SOCRATES: What then, in a vessel tost in a storm? To whom would you rather intrust yourself and your property? To a pilot, or to a philosopher?—

LEARNED RIVAL: To a pilot, for my part, said he.—

SOCRATES: And so, too, in all other affairs; so long as there is a person of skill in a profession, the philosopher is of no use.—

LEARNED RIVAL: It appears so, said he.—

SOCRATES: The philosopher, therefore, said I, is some useless person; for there are surely persons of skill in (all) professions. But we have agreed that the good are useful, and the wicked useless.—

[6.] What then, said I, shall I ask you about what comes after this? or is it not rather rude to put a question?—

LEARNED RIVAL: Ask what you please, said he.—

SOCRATES: I desire nothing else, said I, than to repeat the concessions already made. Now the matter stands thus. We have conceded that philosophy is an honourable thing, and that we are ourselves philosophers; and that philosophers are good; and that the good are useful, and the wicked useless. Again, on the other hand, we have conceded that philosophers are useless, as long as there are persons of skill in any particular profession; and that such persons are existing at all times. For was not all this conceded?—

LEARNED RIVAL: Certainly, said he.—

SOCRATES: We concede, therefore, agreeably to your own reasoning, that if it be philosophy to be skilled in arts in the manner you state, such persons are wicked and useless as long as there are artists. But see, my friend, if the case be so, and that to philosophize is not to attend to arts, nor to busy oneself about many things, nor to be living like a workman, bending over his work, nor to be learning many things, but something else? Since I thought, it was a reproach for persons, much occupied in arts, to be called operatives.

[7.] But we shall know more clearly by this means, whether I am speaking truly, if you will answer me this. Who know how to punish horses correctly? Whether they, who make them better, or others?—

LEARNED RIVAL: They who (make them) better.—

SOCRATES: Well then, do not they, who know how to make dogs better, know how to chastise dogs properly?—

LEARNED RIVAL: Yes.—

SOCRATES: The same art then makes better, and chastises properly.—

LEARNED RIVAL: I agree, said he.—

SOCRATES: Well then, is the art, which makes better and chastises properly, the same as that which knows the good and the vicious, or is it a different one?—

LEARNED RIVAL: It is, said he, the same.—

SOCRATES: Are you then willing, said I, to concede this, in the case of human beings likewise, that the art, which makes men better, is that, which chastises properly, and knows the good and the bad?—

LEARNED RIVAL: By all means, said he.—

SOCRATES: Does not then the art which (applies) to one (apply) to many too, and that which (applies) to many (apply) to one likewise? And so too as regards horses and all other things?—

LEARNED RIVAL: I confess it, (said he.)—

SOCRATES: What then is the science, which chastises properly the licentious and the lawless in civil states? Is it not the judicial science?—

LEARNED RIVAL: Yes.—

SOCRATES: Do you mean by justice any other science than this?—

LEARNED RIVAL: No other.—

SOCRATES: Do not then men know the good and the bad by that science by which they chastise properly?—

LEARNED RIVAL: By that.—

SOCRATES: And he, who knows one, will know many?—

LEARNED RIVAL: Yes.—

SOCRATES: And whoever does not know many, (will not know one.)—

LEARNED RIVAL: I confess it.—

SOCRATES: If then a horse, as being but a horse, knows not good and bad horses, he would not know of which kind he is himself?—

LEARNED RIVAL: I admit it.—

SOCRATES: And if an ox, as being but an ox, knows not good and bad oxen, he would not know of which kind he is himself?—

LEARNED RIVAL: True, said he.—

SOCRATES: And so too, in the case of a dog?—

What then, if a man knows not the good men and the bad, would he not be ignorant whether he is good or bad, inasmuch as he too is a man?—

Now to be ignorant of oneself, is it to be of sound mind or not sound?—

LEARNED RIVAL: Not sound.—

SOCRATES: To know then oneself, is to be of sound mind.—

LEARNED RIVAL: I admit it, said he.—

SOCRATES: To this then, as it seems, the Delphic inscription exhorts, namely, to exercise a sound mind, and justice.—

LEARNED RIVAL: It seems so.—

SOCRATES: And by the very same science we know too how to chastise properly.—

LEARNED RIVAL: I admit it, (said he.)—

SOCRATES: Is not then justice that, by which we know how to chastise properly? but soundness of mind that, by which we have the skill to know ourselves and others?—

LEARNED RIVAL: It seems so, said he.—

SOCRATES: Justice then, said I, and soundness of mind are the same thing.—

LEARNED RIVAL: It appears so.

SOCRATES: [8.] In this way, said I, states are well governed, when they, who do wrong, suffer punishment.—

LEARNED RIVAL: You speak the truth.—

SOCRATES: The same science too, said I, is that of the statesman.—

What then, when a single man administers correctly the affairs of a state, he is not a tyrant, and a king?—

LEARNED RIVAL: I admit it.—

SOCRATES: Does he not administer affairs by the art of the king? or of the tyrant?—

LEARNED RIVAL: Just so.—

SOCRATES: These arts then are the same with those.—

LEARNED RIVAL: They appear so.—

SOCRATES: Well then, when one man administers the affairs of a household correctly, what is his name? Is it not steward, or master?—

LEARNED RIVAL: Yes.—

SOCRATES: Whether by justice would he administer the affairs of a household correctly? or by any other art?—

LEARNED RIVAL: By justice.—

SOCRATES: The same kind of person then, it seems, is a king, a tyrant, a statesman, a steward, a master, a man of sound mind, and a just man; and one is the art of the king, of the tyrant, of the statesman, of the master, of the steward, of the just man, and the man of sound mind.—

LEARNED RIVAL: So it appears, said he.

SOCRATES: [9.] Is it not then disgraceful for a philosopher, when the physician is speaking about persons who are ill, not to be able to follow what is said, nor to give an opinion on what is said or done, and similarly, when any one skilled operative (is speaking)? and when a judge, or a king, or any one else of those whom we have just now enumerated, (is speaking of things belonging to his office,) is it not disgraceful for a philosopher not (to follow what they say or do,) nor to be able to give an opinion respecting them?—

LEARNED RIVAL: How, Socrates, said he, is it not disgraceful for him, to be able to give no opinion on subjects so important?—

SOCRATES: Shall we assert then, said I, that on these points the philosopher must be a competitor in five contests, and be second-rate, having the second prize after all, and be useless, so long as there exists any of the first-rate? Or must he in the first place not commit his household to another person, nor have the second place in that business; but ought himself to chastise after being the judge, if his household is about to be administered correctly.—

And then, said I, should his friends submit an award to him, or the state order him to decide upon any thing, or to act the judge, would it not, my friend, be disgraceful for him to appear in such cases to be second or third, and not to take the lead?—

LEARNED RIVAL: So it seems to me.

SOCRATES: To philosophize therefore, thou best of men, wants much of being great in learning, or the busying oneself about arts.—